SUNNIS VERSUS SHIITES: WHAT’S THE DIFFERENCE?

• First, some background material and data.  Only about 15 % of the world’s Muslims are Shiites, but they dominate two strategic countries in the Middle East—Iran and Syria—and they constitute about a 60% majority within Iraq.  So, although small, Shiites are currently a strategic part of Islam.  Throughout much of Islam’s history, the Shia-Sunni divide has been peaceful.  Geography largely explains this peace, for the far west and the far east are largely Sunni.  Indeed, neither Moroccans or Egyptians nor Indonesians or Bangladeshis know what Shia Islam is.  In fact, Shias have tended to congregate in small and isolated communities in the center of the Islamic world, the Middle East.  In terms of the basic rituals of Islam (e.g., the five pillars), the two branches are not that different.  In important cities such as Baghdad and Beirut, the two have often intermarried.  In fact, from the 10th to the 12th centuries, there was toleration and acceptance of the two branches.  And in the 20th century, there were calls from important scholars and leaders of Islam for reconciliation and acceptance.  However, beneath the surface, there has always been tension and the potential danger of real conflict.

• Second, how did the rift occur and what are its implications for today?  To answer this question, one must go back to the founding of Islam.  After Muhammad died in A.D. 632, there was a bitter struggle over succession.  One group claimed that the prophet had chosen his cousin and son-in-law Caliph Ali, who was also the father of Muhammad’s two grandchildren, Hassan and Hussein.  These were the Shiites, which derives from the word shia or the Arabic phrase, shi’at Ali, the partisans of Ali.  This faction strongly believed that leadership should remain in the Prophet’s family.  The other faction, called Sunnis (Arabic for “tradition”), believed that Muhammad had stated that all future rulers must be selected by the consensus of the other leaders.  That group chose the prophet’s father-in-law, Abu Bakr, to be the new caliph.  The result was a bloody civil war between these factions, with Abu Bakr winning.  The Shiites remained loyal to their prophet’s line and after Ali died, Muhammad’s grandson, Hassan, became the “second imam.”  He was murdered by the Sunnis, an event of huge importance to Shiites, who commemorate his murder by flagellating themselves with bloody chains.  The Shiites teach that ten more imams have descended from the prophet.  The 12th imam mysteriously disappeared, leading to the conviction that in the last days, after a time of lawlessness and violence, he will return.  This 12th imam (the Mahdi), who was born in 868 and is still alive and in hiding, will emerge from Mecca, return in triumph, and with Jesus, impose order and establish Islamic law throughout the earth.  This messianic fervor and belief is what fuels the energy evident in the new Iranian President, Ahmadinejad.  The other major result of this split is the attitude of the Sunnis toward the Shiites.  For the most part, Sunnis regard Shiites as idolaters.  Many orthodox Sunnis do not even consider Shiites to be true Muslims.  As Veith argues, “They do not approve of their veneration of human beings, their devotion to shrines, or their mysticism.  They reject giving canonical authority to later Shiite writings.  Sunni polemical writings accuse Shiites of sexual immorality for permitting temporary marriage—a type of prostitution in which a man pays a woman, says the words of marriage, has sex, and then says the words of divorce.”  Finally, as The Economist recently reported, “. . . there is a rising sense in both communities, and not only in Iraq, of some kind of impending historical showdown.”  One obvious factor in upsetting the old balance is the intrusion of America in Iraq and Afghanistan and the global war against terrorism.  Another more important factor is the radicalization of many Sunni Muslims, who desire to return to a more “pure” form of Islam and unite Muslims into a single nation modeled after the medieval caliphate.  The greatest proponent of this is Sunni Osama bin Laden and his former protector, Mullah Omar, and the Taliban of Afghanistan.  Bin Laden and his lieutenant in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, regard Shiites as turncoats and they are behind the bombings of Shiite mosques and the bloodbath within Iraq today.

• Finally, permit me a review of the major theological differences between Shiites and Sunnis.
  1. Shiites and Sunnis agree on core beliefs of Islam—the Quran and the Five Pillars.
  2. Shiites believe that the original Imams were divinely inspired and infallible in their judgments.
  3. Shiites clerics (imams) hold an elevated spiritual status forbidden by the Sunnis.
  4. Sunnis reject the teaching of a “hidden” imam but do accept the end-time beliefs of the Quran.
  5. Shiites have a deep regard for martyrdom, incorporating many rituals and demonstrations absent in Sunnis.
  6. Shiites are more eschatological than Sunnis.
  7. Shiites believe that the Imam al-Mahdi, the “Expected or Awaited” leader, will herald the end of time when he returns.  The Mahdi and his army of followers will in effect be the army of Jesus before he returns.  They will join Jesus in defeating the antichrist, liberate Palestine and unite the world under Islam.  Again, this belief is what drives the current Iranian president. 

In conclusion, the struggle between Shiite and Sunni Islam is intensifying and boiling within Iraq and Iran.  Quite frankly, it is difficult to be optimistic about this in the short run.

See The Economist (4 March 2006), pp. 20-23; Gene Edward Veith, World (11 March 2006), p. 30; and Chuck Vollmer, PowerPoint presentation (26 January 2006), “Iranian President Ahmadinejad, Islamic Eschatology and Near-Term Implications.”