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When the United States defeated al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001-2002, the al Qaeda leaders fled to the tribal, border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan. That region has never been really governed by any central government—either from Pakistan or Afghanistan. Rather, tribal leaders have been the governing force. That region has now become the vital center of al Qaeda operations. The al Qaeda senior leaders now oversee and give direction to the most concentrated reservoir of Islamic jihadists in the world. It is a mixture of Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, Pakistani sectarian extremists, Kashmiri militants and other foreign fighters from other parts of the Middle East. Al Qaeda provides to all these groups technical expertise, training, an ideology and money. As The Economist reports, “All have been protected by the honor code of the Pushtun tribes, with whom foreign fighters have forged close relations since the days of the anti-Soviet jihad. Some of the foreigners have taken local wives and many Pushtun warriors have embraced the ideology of global jihad.”
Although this region is not as beneficial as when these forces ruled the entire nation of Afghanistan, it does provide al Qaeda with a place to regroup its senior lieutenants, broadcast its propaganda, train this new generation of jihadists and plot new attacks. These groups, especially the Taliban, are fueling the Afghan insurgency, which is now more deadly in terms of American casualties, than Iraq. Is the Pakistan government a help or a hindrance in this battle? The Economist reports that the “Pakistani forces, some of whose outposts are within shouting distance of American positions, play an ambiguous role: sometimes they turn a blind eye to the insurgents, and sometimes they help the Americans spot them.” Why is this border region so unstable and unpredictable? Out of British India, Pakistan was partitioned as a separate Muslim state in 1947. But the actual border with Afghanistan was rather fuzzy and unclear: There emerged an actual strip of mountainous land, a kind of buffer zone, that remained an autonomous tribal area. The seven districts of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas are run by the president’s office through a governor of the North-West Frontier Province and “agents” that governor appoints. Basically, this frontier region is neglected and often ignored by the central government in Pakistan. Income there is about half that of the average Pakistani. Under Musharraf, the Pakistani government has sent the army into this region to hunt al Qaeda leaders, but today the new government is not as supportive of American goals in this area. However, in 2006 Musharraf agreed to a truce with the Taliban and al Qaeda. This truce left both al Qaeda and the Taliban stronger than before. One of the key tribal leaders in Waziristan, the largest of the tribal agencies, Baitullah Mehsud, a Pakistani Taliban, has declared: “Islam does not recognize frontiers or borders.” Hence, he sees it as his right to attack American and Afghanistan forces across the border in Afghanistan.
The only possible solution to this mess is the full integration of these tribal regions into the country of Pakistan—both politically and economically. But until then, al Qaeda and Taliban forces and leaders in these border regions will remain formidable foes for both the government of Pakistan and for Afghanistan. It is the army of Pakistan that is most influential and powerful on this matter of al Qaeda and the Taliban. In the past the army has surrendered control to these radical elements. There does not seem to be any reason to conclude that things have changed. For that reason, the United States is offering $750 million to the Pakistani government for the economic development of the tribal regions, but only if the government adopts some of the US methods of counter-insurgency to strengthen its grip on the tribal regions. But the army has lost over 1,000 troops in fighting these elements and 250 of its soldiers were actually kidnapped by Mehsud. The army, therefore, is tired and demoralized. In short, there is little reason to believe that things will change, even with the new government of Pakistan. The army especially fears the Islamic jihadists and is unwilling to do what needs to be done in the tribal regions. Until and unless the army of Pakistan takes the initiative and pushes back very hard in these regions, there is little hope that al Qaeda and the Taliban will be defeated or even neutralized as a power and a force in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.
See The Economist (19 July 2008), pp. 5-7 of a “Special Report on al Qaeda.” |
