THE WORLD’S TROUBLE SPOTS AND THE UNITED STATES

• First, an overview of one aspect of this new order—the demise of the traditional nation-state.  Recently, columnist Tom Friedman argued that we are witnessing a major shift in the global balance of power.  With the enormous increase in oil prices, we are observing a huge transfer of wealth to petro-authoritarian governments.  This transfer is so enormous that OPEC, if it so desired, could purchase much of America’s corporate structure in a manner of weeks.  Few of these governments actually have geopolitical interests that resemble those of the US.  In fact, many are actually hostile to US interests.  Yet, we continue to buy their oil and give little consideration to conservation or to alternative sources of energy.  Further, the BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India and China) are moving up to America’s level of economic clout and economic power.  Fareed Zakaria writes:  “Today, India has 18 all-news channels of its own.  And the perspectives they provide are very different from those you will get in the Western media.”  They now have the confidence to present their own narrative, where they are at the center.  The US has always dominated the world when it comes to research universities, its free market and the diversity of its human talent, but the BRIC nations are catching up.  Zakaria writes again:  “[Because these nations are now saving, working hard and thinking long term], they have adopted our lessons and are playing our game.  [If we do not fix our political system and start thinking strategically about how to improve our competitiveness,] the US risks having its unique and advantageous position in the world erode as other countries rise.”  Finally, Freidman quotes David Rothkopf, who sees the influence of nation-states as waning, particularly in addressing global issues.  Their lack of influence creates a power vacuum, which is being filled by a small group of players who Rothkopf calls the “superclass,” a new global elite, who are much better suited to operating and influencing things on the global stage.  He writes:  [Some of these elite] “are from business and finance.  Some are members of a kind of shadow elite—criminals and terrorists.  Some are masters of new or traditional media; some are religious leaders, and a few are top officials of those governments that do have the ability to project their influence globally.”  The BRIC states and this new global elite place the US in an untenable position:  “Call it a triple deficit.  A fiscal deficit that will soon have us choosing between rationed health care, sufficient education, adequate infrastructure and traditional levels of defense spending, a trade deficit that has us borrowing from our rivals to the point of real vulnerability, and a geo-political deficit that is a legacy of Iraq, which may result in a hesitancy to take strong stands where we must.”

• Second, these new realities in the global restructuring are evident in several developments over the last few weeks.  There is evidence that America is drawing inward and American power is uncertain and questionable.  As the US waits to see who its next president will be, the world cannot wait.  Local power structures are making decisions without the US and these decisions could have profound effects for the long term.  Consider the following:
  
  
  1. The recent deal between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government.  The US had nothing to do with it.  The agreement was brokered by Arab mediators in Doha, Qatar, and involved extensive last-minute diplomacy among major regional players in Lebanon, including Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia.  There is little question that this deal strongly favors Hezbollah.  The deal to form a new Lebanese government promises to end the 18 months of political deadlock and it underscores the rising power of Iran and Syria, both of which have backed Hezbollah.  However, the deal leaves unresolved the issues that originally provoked the crisis in December 2006, namely Hezbollah’s weapons and Lebanon’s relations with Syria, which ended its 29-year military presence in Lebanon in 2005 after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.  The agreement provides for a new unity government of 16 cabinet seats for the governing majority, 11 for the opposition and 3 to be nominated by the new president, the army chief, Gen. Michel Suleiman.  The deal will now permit the opposition to veto cabinet decisions, which in effect means Hezbollah.  The deal also paves the way for a new electoral law that, if approved, will divide up Lebanon into new, smaller electoral districts, in an effort to better reflect the various sects of Lebanon.  When, at the encouragement of the US and Saudi Arabia, the present government of Lebanon challenged Hezbollah’s private telecommunications network and its control over the Beirut airport, Hezbollah’s leader, Sheik Nasrallah, declared these decisions an act of war.  He sent his forces and allies into the streets.  That threat of continued open civil war led to this agreement.  Hezbollah threatened extensive violence and got its way—an opportunity to extend its influence within the Lebanese government.  [Amazingly, Hezbollah had been building a communications network stretching for more than 200 miles—in a nation only 140 miles long.  This network involved fiber-optic cable and had the effect of wireless transmitters and redundancies so that even in war time, communications would continue.  This work was done with the “participation in the field” [the government reported] of the Iranian Headquarters for the Reconstruction of Lebanon, an Iranian agency that has claimed credit for hundreds of rebuilding projects since the 2006 war.]  As Cam Simpson has reported in the Wall Street Journal, “Hezbollah sees itself not only as a defender of Lebanon but as a vital link in the Iranian and Syrian alliance against the US in the broader Middle East region.”  Therefore, this agreement does seem to be a rebuke of US diplomatic efforts in the region to marginalize Syria and Iran, the major supporters of Hezbollah.  There is little doubt that this agreement is a huge victory for Hezbollah—one one that spells serious challenges for Israel.  Hezbollah has made it clear that it will never recognize Israel’s existence and will be a major threat to Israel on its northern border.  As Andrew Lee Butters of Time has argued, “Unlike Hamas, which is confined to poverty-stricken Gaza, Hezbollah has at its disposal an entire country, complete with a sophisticated banking system, an international airport and a friendly neighbor in Syria.  Never has a terrorist organization had that kind of infrastructure.”
  
  
  2. The negotiations between Israel and Syria.  It was revealed last week that, with the aid of Turkey as a mediator, Syria and Israel are conducting indirect peace talks.  Apparently, this dialogue began early last year.  Obviously, any negotiations must involve Israel withdrawing from the Golan Heights, which Israel seized during the 1967 war.  [In fact, Israel had annexed the Golan Heights, because before 1967, Syria had daily bombarded northern Israel with artillery, making life in the north virtually impossible.]  Turkey is a logical broker of such a deal because it sees itself as a major player in regional peacemaking and has been Israel’s main Muslim ally since the nations agreed to a military-cooperation pact in 1996.  Are these serious negotiations?  Because they are not direct negotiations, it is difficult to judge their meaning.  Further, Syria is a strong supporter of the two militant terrorist groups—Hezbollah and Hamas—that pose the greatest present threat to Israel.  Because Syria is classified by the US as a state sponsor of terrorism, it is unusual that Israel would engage in such negotiations without the support of the US.  But Israel and the US have disagreed over how to approach Syria.  Twice before, under Prime Ministers Yitzak Rabin and Ehud Barak, similar efforts to sign a deal with Syria failed.  But this time, there are extenuating circumstances:  Ehud Olmert is politically weak, with a thin parliamentary majority, rather dependent on the right-wing religious Shas party.  He also is facing a criminal investigation.  Both of these realities make any deal questionable.  Despite the strong reservations of the US, Israel could be trying to pull Syria away from the orbit of Iran and return it to a more pro-Western world of Egypt, Jordan and to some extent Saudi Arabia.  Because Syria provides Hezbollah with rockets and arms, trying to end that kind of support would be an obvious item on the table in such negotiations.  But the reality is it is very difficult seeing Israel returning the Golan Heights to Syria.  Security issues as well as access to the waterline of the Sea of Galilee are at stake as well.  Israel would not want to lose that access which it has enjoyed since 1967.  But that Israel has even been indirectly talking with Syria means it is defying the US position.  For the Bush administration, such negotiations would appear to reward Syria at a time when the US is seeking to isolate it for its meddling in Lebanon and its backing of Hezbollah.  Israel has not listened to the US!

See Jim Hoagland in the Washington Post (25 May 2008); Tom Friedman in the New York Times (21 May 2008); Cam Simpson on Lebanon in the Wall Street Journal (22 May 2008); Robert Worth and Nada Bakri in the New York Times (22 May 2008); Helene Cooper in the New York Times (22 May 2008); Andrew Lee Butters in Time (26 May 2008), p. 31; and Cam Simpson on Syria-Israeli negotiations in the Wall Street Journal (22 May 2008).

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