For this week’s program, I am not following my normal, three-perspective format.  Instead, I will focus on four aspects of the Iraq/Afghanistan situation.

1. THE UNITED NATIONS

That the UN needs reform is a given.  Increasingly, people are asking whether the UN is indeed relevant to our ever-changing world.  It is already clear that the events of 9/11/01 have cost the UN dearly.  The fundamental assumption of its neutrality has been replaced, within the Muslim world, with the assumption that the UN is simply a tool of the US.  Perhaps that is the reason terrorists bombed the UN headquarters in Baghdad last month.  The UN is no longer perceived as neutral and its buildings and its people are legitimate terrorist targets.

The reality is that the different parts of the globe view the UN differently.  The Europeans view the UN as the embodiment of international law and world order.  The US views the UN as an instrument of diplomacy that is out of touch with reality.  The African and Asian parts of the world view the UN in more case-specific situations and see it as a general advocate for the world’s poor and disadvantaged.

For these two reasons, Kofi Annan has quietly been calling for the UN to restructure itself.  As I have argued on this program, the Security Council must reflect the world of 2003, not the world of 1945.  It must be more representative of the power centers and structures of the present-day world.  Furthermore, overarching security issues like nuclear proliferation are never settled within the UN.  They just keep reoccurring.  Also, it provides some security in difficult situations but, most agree, it is largely ineffectual in halting violent conflicts in Central and West Africa, where economic realities run into historic tribal warfare.  If the US or the European Union did not enter into the foray, such conflicts would not be resolved.  Witness present day Liberia.

Therefore, the Bush administration is wary of bringing the UN into Iraq in any major way.  President Bush addressed the UN this past Tuesday, where he made the case for the UN to help with the economic and humanitarian needs of Iraq.  He does not seek to empower the UN to aid in building the new nation.  The UN does not have a good record in doing so; hence the skepticism of the Bush administration.  Since it never acted decisively on Saddam Hussein through the 1990s, why trust that it can be decisive now?

In short, the UN is a conundrum.  Created in the last days of World War II, it met the needs of that world.  It did get involved in Korea militarily.  But in today’s world it increasingly seems ineffective and impotent.  It does not work well with the US and it cannot be effective in solving the dilemmas of Africa.  Kofi Annan and many others are proclaiming to the UN--change or die!

See Felicity Barringer’s article in the New York Times (19 September 2003).

2. AFGHANISTAN AND THE TALIBAN

In response to the 9/11/01 attacks, President Bush launched the US on an unprecedented campaign to rid the world of terrorism.  That effort has resulted in regime-change in two countries—Afghanistan and Iraq.  The result has been increasing costs in both American lives and treasure.  The situation in Afghanistan is more and more problematic. 

• First, the Taliban, backed by new volunteers from Pakistan, are regrouping and steadily expanding their attacks in southern and eastern Afghanistan, their former stronghold.  In the region, the Taliban have changed their tactics.  Not only are American forces being attacked, but so are Afghan policemen, aid workers and mid-level officials.  These intermittent attacks have made the south and the east an unpredictable mosaic of territory that is safe one day and dangerous the next.  Therefore, the pace of reconstruction and investment is slowing and the south and east, both Pashtun strongholds, are becoming more alienated from the Kabul government.  The Kabul government of Hamid Karzai is struggling to extend its authority into these isolated parts of the country and the Taliban are challenging that.  Mullah Muhammad Omar, the Taliban commander, recently announced the creation of a 10-member leadership council to “expedite jihad against occupation forces.”  In short, the Taliban are engaging in small guerrilla attacks and masterful psychological warfare against the Karzai government and the US.  Their mantra is the Americans and the international community will leave someday, and we will come back.  The result is fear and an unwillingness to cooperate with Kabul or with the US.  This is a battle for the heart and soul of Afghanistan.

See David Rohde, New York Times (1 September 2003).

See Time (22 September 2003).

• Third, why has the US not been successful in capturing or killing bin Laden or Mullah Omar?  The answer is that the local population in Waziristan supports bin Laden and Omar.  They are objects of a most successful propaganda campaign that depicts the US as a threat to all that is good.  Islamic radicalism is stronger in western Pakistan than it is in neighboring Afghanistan.  Because al Qaeda and the Taliban find haven and support in Waziristan, Afghanistan will face continued threats from this region.  It will also necessitate that at some point the US and its allies will need to face these terrorist organizations in Waziristan.  There is inevitability about such a confrontation.  If we are serious about the war on terror, we will need to go to Waziristan. 

See David Rohde, in the New York Times (14 September 2003). 

3. THE NEW MILITARY REALITY

Both Afghanistan and Iraq point to a new military reality for the US:  A rapid, amazing military victory, followed by a bloody peace.  In both nations, the US emerged victorious quickly and decisively.  Its military superiority, largely via its remarkable technology, was no match for the Taliban and al Qaeda, nor was it a match for Saddam’s Republican Guard.  However, what both nations now illustrate is a terrorist ideology that can be contained but not defeated.  This has produced a massive dilemma for the US.  But we must have the perspective of history here.  It took four years before the first election was held in Germany, after the war had ended in 1945.  It took 54 years to win the wider struggle against Communism.  It is this long term view that President Bush has.  He sees both areas as a struggle to remake the Middle East as a region of possibility and democracy rather than a place where frustrations seethe under authoritarian governments, breeding anti-American violence.  In other words, the US has embarked upon an arduous and daunting task of building two nations at once.  Both involve building an infrastructure in the midst of a sometimes hostile population.  Both involve fighting an increasingly well-planned guerilla operation.  Both involve efforts to win the allegiance of the local populations, who are also receiving threat and propaganda from the terrorist networks.  The President must make it clear to the American people that this will be a long fight, involving years, not months, and possibly decades.  Will the American people support this?  Will the world community help us?  Both questions need positive answers.

See Amy Waldman and Dexter Filkins in the New York Times (19 September 2003).

4. ARE WE SEPTEMBER 10 AMERICANS?

This is the question Lawrence Kaplan recently asked in an op ed piece in the Wall Street Journal (11 September 2003).  His argument is that there are today really two Americas—a “September 11 America” caught up in a world war, and a “September 10 America” largely oblivious to it.  This divide is evidenced by the latest polls that, by a two-to-one margin, indicate voters identify the economy as a more important problem for the federal government to address, while issues like prescription drugs and health care are on the political front burner.  In addition, this divide is evidenced by slumping rates in church attendance, diminished faith in public institutions, and numerous barometers of civic disengagement.

What is the nature of this divide?  Kaplan demonstrates that evangelical Christians, whites, residents of rural areas, southerners and self-described conservatives evidence more concern about terrorism that do secular Americans, African-Americans, residents of cities, non-southerners, or self-described liberals.  Kaplan writes, “When September 11 Americans look back at the attacks, they see an event that requires an overhaul of national priorities.  When September 10 Americans look back at the attacks, they see an event whose significance is emotional, even spiritual, but most of all historical.  What they do not see is the opening salvo of a years-long struggle, much less its implications for politics and policy.” 

Kaplan concludes: “that most of us have resumed living by September 10 rules would hardly matter but for the inconvenient fact that America’s foes still play by September 11 rules.”  This is certainty and few Americans today affirm that.  We are still not hearing words like “sacrifice,” “suffering,” and “courage” for the long haul. 

Kaplan is correct: America is divided over how to look at 9/11/01.  Until that is settled, there will be no victory over terrorism.